Re-Identifying the Rebound – What About Asymmetry? by Manuel Frondel & Colin Vance
RUHR
ECONOMIC PAPERS





Ruhr Economic Papers 
Published by
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors 
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics, Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 22 83 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231/7 55-3297, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-3655, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Oﬃ   ce 
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #276 
Responsible Editor: Christoph M. Schmidt
All rights reserved. Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Germany, 2011
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-321-4
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers #276
Manuel Frondel and Colin Vance
Re-Identifying the Rebound –
What About Asymmetry?Bibliograﬁ  sche Informationen 
der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen National-
bibliograﬁ  e; detaillierte bibliograﬁ  sche Daten sind im Internet über: 
http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufb  ar.
ISSN 1864-4872 (online)
ISBN 978-3-86788-321-4Manuel Frondel and Colin Vance1
Re-Identifying the Rebound –
What About Asymmetry?
Abstract
Rebound eﬀ  ects measure the behaviorally induced oﬀ  set in the reduction of energy 
consumption following eﬃ   ciency improvements. Using panel estimation methods and 
household travel diary data collected in Germany between 1997 and 2009, this study 
identiﬁ  es the rebound eﬀ  ect in private transport by allowing for the possibility that fuel 
price elasticities – from which rebound eﬀ  ects can be derived – are asymmetric. This 
approach rests on evidence that has emerged from the empirical literature suggesting 
that the response in individual travel demand to price increases is stronger than to 
decreases. Such an asymmetric response would necessitate reference to the fuel price 
elasticity derived from price decreases in order to identify the rebound eﬀ  ect, as the 
rebound occurs in response to a decrease in unit cost for car travel due to improved 
fuel eﬃ   ciency. While we fail to reject the hypothesis that the magnitude of the response 
to a price increase is equal to that of a price decrease, our rebound eﬀ  ect estimate for 
single-vehicle households of 58% is in line with a recent German study by Frondel, 
Peters, and Vance (2008).
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Energy efﬁciency standards are seen as a cornerstone in the efforts to meet the Eu-
ropean Commission’s international commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. In the
transport sector, for instance, which accounts for roughly 20% of the EU’s CO2 emis-
sions, regulation 443/2009 sets limits on the allowable per-kilometer carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions of newly registered automobiles. As non-compliance with the allo-
wable emissions will result in heavy ﬁnes starting in 2012, the European Commission
expects that this measure will induce considerable incentives for the development of
fuel-saving technologies (FRONDEL,S CHMIDT, and VANCE, 2011).
Irrespective of the directive’s effectiveness in increasing the average fuel efﬁcien-
cy of Europe’s automobile ﬂeet, a critical issue in gauging its merits concerns how
consumers adjust to altered unit cost of car travel. Presuming that mobility is a con-
ventional good, a decrease in this cost would result in an increased demand for car
travel. This demand increase is referred to as the rebound effect (KHAZZOOM, 1980),
as it offsets – at least partially – the reduction in energy demand that would result from
an increase in efﬁciency. Though the existence of the rebound effect is widely accep-
ted, its magnitude remains a contentious issue (e. g. BROOKES, 2000; BINSWANGER,
2001; SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS, 2008). A survey by GOODWIN,D ARGAY, and
HANLY (2004), for example, cites mean fuel demand elasticities – from which rebound
effects can be derived – varying between -0.1 in the short-run and -1.1 in the long-run.
More recent work by WEST (2004) and FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008), who use
household-level pooled and panel data from the U.S. and Germany, puts the estima-
ted rebound effect at the high end of this range, averaging between 87% and 58-59%,
respectively.
Several factors may account for the wide range in estimates, including differences
in the level of data aggregation, in the estimation methods employed, and in the deﬁni-
tion of the rebound effect. A further issue that has complicated efforts to estimate fuel
price elasticities relates to the possibility that motorists respond asymmetrically to fuel
price increases and decreases. In particular, several studies have emerged suggesting
4that the response to price increases is stronger than the response to price decreases.
As GATELY (1992) and others have argued, asset ﬁxity provides one explanation for
this so-called hysteresis1: improved auto design features that emerge in response to
higher fuel prices are unlikely to be abandoned after prices fall, giving rise to a mu-
ted demand response. Numerous empirical studies by DARGAY(1992), GATELY(1992),
HOGAN (1993), DARGAY and GATELY (1994, 1997), GATELY and HUNTINGTON (2002),
and HUNTINGTON (2006) lend support to this view.
GRIFFIN and SCHULMAN (2005) have countered that the plausibility of asset ﬁxi-
ty notwithstanding, it is incorrect to associate this with an asymmetric price response.
Rather, these authors suggest that energy-saving technical change yields the spurious
appearance of differing consumer reactions to price increases and decreases. When
GRIFFIN and SCHULMAN include time dummies to account for technical change in
their panel model of oil and energy consumption in the OECD, they conclude that a
symmetric price response cannot be rejected, a claim that is challenged by HUNTING-
TON (2006). In an earlier analysis that takes into account inter-fuel substitution for resi-
dential energy demand, RYAN,W ANG, and PLOURDE (1996) also ﬁnd no evidence for
asymmetric price responses.
The absence of a clear consensus on the existence of an asymmetric fuel response
has important implications for policy analysis, not only with respect to projections of
gasoline demand (GATELY 1992), but also with respect to assessments of fuel taxati-
on as a transport demand management tool. As DARGAY (1993:89) has noted, were an
asymmetry to exist, then at least part of the demand reduction generated by fuel pri-
ce increases would be maintained even following a return to lower prices. This logic
carries directly over to the analysis of the efﬁciency standards and the rebound effect:
If the response to increases in the per kilometer cost of driving is measurably stronger
than the response to decreases, then naive calculations of the rebound effect based on
reversibility would be overestimated.
1The notion of hysteresis originates from the physics of magnetism and refers to an effect that persists
after its cause has been removed (DARGAY,G ATELY, 1997:71).
5Using data from a German household panel, the present study advances under-
standing of fuel price asymmetries and the rebound effect in several respects. First, and
contrary to previous studies, we suggest a novel deﬁnition of the direct2 rebound ef-
fect that lends itself to an asymmetric modeling of fuel price responses. Presuming that
the asymmetry assumption is found to be correct, we argue that the rebound effect is
consequently identiﬁed by an elasticity estimate that reﬂects changes in travel demand
due to decreases in fuel prices, as the rebound effect occurs in response to a decrease in
the unit cost for car travel due to improved fuel efﬁciency.
Second,contrastingwiththetypicalrelianceontime-seriesoraggregatedcountry-
level panel data, the data used here is drawn from individual households whose mo-
bility behavior is surveyed for up to three consecutive years. This focus circumvents
many of the identiﬁcation challenges that confront studies using more aggregate da-
ta. Our data structure effectively allows isolation of the short-run behavioral response
to changes in fuel prices by focusing on households that have not changed their cars
over the three years they are surveyed, thereby reducing the possibility that mainly
technical change is driving the result.
Finally,expandingonthesingle-carfocusof FRONDEL,P ETERS,and VANCE(2008),
the data set analyzed here includes multiple-vehicle households, thereby allowing us
to explore the sensitivity of the estimates to their inclusion. In addition, the robustness
and sensitivity of the results of the former study is checked by employing four additio-
nal waves of data for the years 2006 to 2009, so that the number of households of our
database almost doubled.
The following section provides for a household production model of private mo-
2The indirect rebound effect and general equilibrium effects have also been distinguished in the lite-
rature (see, e. g. , SORRELL,D IMITROUPOULOS,S OMMERVILLE, 2009:1356). The indirect rebound effect
arises from an income effect: lower per-unit cost of an energy service implies – ceteris paribus – that dispo-
sable income grows. General equilibrium effects arise from innovations, such as James WATT’s famous
steam engine, that increase society’s aggregate income potential. Given that both indirect and general
equilibrium effects are difﬁcult to quantify, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies conﬁnes
itself to analyzing the direct rebound effect.
6bility demand. Section 3 presents a concise description of the panel data set, building
the basis for the empirical estimation. Section 4 describes our estimation method, fol-
lowed by the presentation and interpretation of the results in Section 5. The last section
summarizes and concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
Using BECKER’s (1965) household production framework, we develop a theoretical
model to illustrate that symmetric demand responses to fuel price changes are plau-
sible only under very restrictive assumptions, so that, generally, asymmetry should
prevail. Taking account of asymmetric effects is important for numerous reasons. First,
with respect to the direct rebound effect, for which we present the common rebound
deﬁnitions in the appendix, this effect might be mis-measured if asymmetry is ignored.
Second, if there are asymmetries, for instance, because motorists learn to drive more
efﬁciently due to price increases, but do not stop driving efﬁciently when prices go
down, price volatility might be a conservation measure and, hence, an effective means
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
To formally explain the plausibility of asymmetric demand responses, we draw
on BECKER’s seminal work on household production and assume that households are,
ultimately, not interested in the amount of energy required for a certain amount of
service, but in the energy service, such as mobility and home heating, itself:
si = fi(ei,ti,ki,oi), (1)
where production function fi describes how households “produce” service i in the
amount of si by using time, ti, capital, ki, other market goods oi, and energy, ei. The
higher the efﬁciency μi of a given technology, the less energy ei = si/μi is required
for the provision of service i, which reﬂects the deﬁnition of energy efﬁciency typically





For the speciﬁc example of individual conveyance, parameter μi can be measured in
terms of vehicle kilometers per liter of fuel input. Based on efﬁciency deﬁnition (2), it
follows that the price psi per unit of the energy service, given by the ratio of service











It is further assumed that any household’s utility depends solely on the amounts
s1,...,sn of services:







< 0 for i = 1,...,n. (4)
Any household’s available time budget T is split up into the hours tw spent on working
and the time necessary to produce services:










peiei + pkiki + poioi, (6)
if the non-wage income is assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity. pei and poi indi-
cate the prices of energy and other market good inputs, respectively, while pki captures
the annualized investment cost required for satisfying the demand si for service i.
The Lagrangian L for the utility maximization problem subject to budget cons-
traint (6) and time restriction (5) reads:





(peiei + pkiki + poioi + wti) − wT

. (7)
3This efﬁciency deﬁnition assumes proportionality between service level and energy input regardless
of the level – a simplifying assumption that may not be true in general, but provides for a convenient
ﬁrst-order approximation of the relationship of the service level with respect to the energy input.




















If price alterations merely change the service demand sj, but do not alter the input




= λ · psj, (9)
where we have employed price relationship (3), i. e. psj = pe/μj, and ∂ej/∂sj = 1/μj,
thereby exploiting efﬁciency deﬁnition (2). The following proposition demonstrates
that for this special case, one would expect a symmetric effect of rising and falling
prices on service demand.
Proposition:I f ∂u
∂sj > 0 and ∂2u
∂s2
j
< 0 and if price changes do not alter the input of time tj,




∂sj = 0, and
∂oj
∂sj = 0,




and, ﬁnally, for Δ+psj = −Δ−psj, where Δ+psj := Δpsj > 0,Δ−psj := −Δpsj < 0, it is:








Proof: The ﬁrst-order condition (9) can be solved for sj, since ∂u










∂sj)−1 designates the inverse of ∂u
∂sj, which solely depends on psj, as the argu-
ment of ( ∂u
∂sj)−1 is λ· psj with λ being constant. Using the differentiation rule for inverse
























< 0 and λ > 0, which results from ∂u
∂sj > 0 and ﬁrst-order condition (9).
Finally, for Δ+psj = −Δ−psj, the symmetry in demand responses given by (10)
results immediately from the fact that, in this special case, demand sj solely depends
on price psj, from which Δ+sj :=
∂sj
∂psj
· Δ+psj and Δ−sj :=
∂sj
∂psj
· Δ−psj follow. It bears
noting that for any given price p0
sj, the second derivative ∂2u
∂s2 on the right-hand-side of
equation (11) is well-deﬁned, and so are
∂sj
∂psj
, Δ+sj, and Δ−sj, as utility u(s1,s2,...,sn) is
a twice differentiable function, for which the demand curves exhibit no kinks. Among
other assumptions, it is thus the well-behavedness of the utility function that provides
for the proposed symmetry result. 
In general, however, the preconditions of this proposition are not given, because
energy price changes may also alter the input of time tj or of capital kj, rather than only
affect service demand sj and, hence, energy input ej. For instance, as a consequence
of a fuel price shock, a household may buy a new, more fuel-efﬁcient automobile so
that
∂kj
∂sj  = 0 and, hence, service demand would be different even when prices would
return to the original level, yielding the hysteresis effect described above. In short,
as this section’s household production model illustrates, one would generally expect
asymmetric mobility demand responses due to either rising and falling fuel prices.
3 Data
The data used in this research is drawn from the German Mobility Panel (MOP 2011),
an ongoing travel survey that was initiated in 1994. The panel is organized in over-
lapping waves, each comprising a group of households surveyed for a period of six
weeks in the spring for three consecutive years. All households that participate in the
survey are requested to ﬁll out a questionnaire eliciting general household informati-
on, person-related characteristics, and relevant aspects of everyday travel behavior. In
addition, respondents record the price paid for fuel, the liters of fuel consumed, and
the kilometers driven for every car in the household.
10The data used in this paper cover thirteen years, spanning 1997 through 2009,
a period during which real fuel prices rose some 2 % per annum on average. Our
primary focus is on single-car households that did not change their car over the three
yearsofthesurvey,therebyabstractingfromcomplexitiesassociatedwiththeinﬂuence
of technological change. The resulting sample comprises a total of 1,125 observations
covering 744 households. We also explore the inclusion of multi-car households, which
results in a sample size of 1,470 observations across 994 households.
The travel survey information, which is recorded at the level of the automobile,
is used to derive the dependent and explanatory variables required for estimating the
rebound effect. To this end, for empirical reasons explained in the appendix, we prefer
Deﬁnition 4 of the rebound deﬁnitions presented there, which is based on the fuel
price elasticity of mobility demand. Hence, the dependent variable, which is converted
into monthly ﬁgures to adjust for minor variations in the survey duration, is the total
monthly distance driven in kilometers. The key explanatory variable for identifying
the direct rebound effect is the price paid for fuel per liter.4 To distinguish between the
response to rising and falling prices, two price variables, p+ and p−, are employed,
whose deﬁnition is given in Table 1 and explained in detail in the next section.
The suite of control variables selected for inclusion in the model measure the
socio-economic attributes that are hypothesized to inﬂuence the extent of motorized
travel. These capture the demographic composition of the household, its income, the
surrounding population density, and dummies indicating the availability of multiple
cars, whether the household undertook a vacation with the car during the survey pe-
riod, and whether any employed member of the household changed jobs in the pre-
ceding year. As a proxy for the availability of public transit, we expect the variable
population density, which is measured in thousand people per square kilometer, to ha-
ve a negative impact on the dependent variable, the distance driven, whereas income
should have a positive effect. As we believe that undertaking a vacation trip with the
car crucially depends on factors other than current fuel prices, such as preferences for
4The price series was deﬂated using a consumer price index for Germany obtained from DESTATIS
(2011).
11the vacation destination and the cost of alternative modes, such as the ﬂight cost for
the whole family, we have included the variable vacation with car in the model speciﬁ-
cation.
Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. Dev.
s Monthly kilometers driven 1,110 689
pe Real fuel price in e per liter 1.03 0.15
p+ Equals pe if pit > pi(t−1) and 0 otherwise 1.07 0.14
p− Equals pe if pit ≤ pi(t−1) and 0 otherwise 0.98 0.14
# children Number of children younger
than 18 in the household 0.35 0.76
# employed Number of employed household members 0.73 0.76
income Real Household income in 1,000 e 2.11 0.66
job change Dummy: 1 if an employed household member
changed jobs within the preceding year 0.11 –
vacation with car Dummy: 1 if household undertook
vacation with car during the survey period 0.22 –
multi-car households Dummy: 1 if a household has more
than one car 0.35 –
population density People in 1,000 per square km in the county
in which the household is situated 0.95 1.07
Note: The means reported for p+ and p− are the means of the non-vanishing values.
4 Methodology
To capture potentially different responses to rising and falling prices, several price
decomposition approaches have been suggested in the literature that have been fre-
quently used in empirical studies. These include the jagged ratchet model proposed
by WOLFFRAM (1971), the ratchet speciﬁcation of TRAILL et al. (1978), and the price
decomposition approach employed by GATELY (1992). In detail, along with price va-
riable p, to capture the potentially asymmetric effects of prices rises above the previous
12maximum, TRAILL et al. (1978) include the variable pmax, which is deﬁned as follows:
pmax(0)=p(0), pmax(t)=p(t) if p(t) > p(t − τ) for τ = 1,...,t and pmax(t)=p(t − 1)
otherwise. GATELY’s price decomposition approach decomposes the price variable p
into three components: pcut, precovery, and pmax, where pmax is deﬁned as in the ratchet
model of TRAILL,C OLMAN, and YOUNG (1978), while pcut and precovery capture pri-
ce cuts and recoveries, respectively, and are deﬁned accordingly. For example, pcut is
deﬁned by pcut(0)=0, pcut(t)=pcut(t − 1)+p(t) − p(t − 1) if p(t) < p(t − 1), and
pcut(t)=pcut(t − 1) otherwise.
In what follows, we deliberately refrain from employing such classical models
for several reasons: First, GRIFFIN and SCHULMAN (2005:7) criticize these models for
being highly dependent on the starting point of the data. In fact, while choosing the
ﬁrst year of the sampling period as starting point, for which pmax is set to the price
p(0) observed in this year, seems natural from the perspective of an empiricist, it ap-
pears to be quite arbitrary from a theoretical point of view. A second troubling aspect
of the price decomposition approach, which includes the ratchet models as special ca-
ses, may be seen in the fact that the demand curve can shift inward purely due to price
volatility, although the average price level remains ﬁxed, an issue illustrated by GRIF-
FIN and SCHULMAN (2005:7) by a simple example. While, formally, this inward shift
is due to the inclusion of the price cut and recovery variables pcut and precovery, such
an inward shift of demand curve may be plausible, however, if price volatility is an ef-
fective energy conservation measure indeed (see the discussion at the outset of Section
2).
Third, while abstaining from the application of such classical approaches that
capture long-run demand relationships and potential shifts of the corresponding de-
mand curve in the long term (DARGAY, 1992:169), we choose a model speciﬁcation that
allows for identifying possible asymmetric fuel price responses in the short term, as we
deliberately conﬁne our investigation to households that have not changed their cars
over the three years they are surveyed. Focusing on the last of the four deﬁnitions of
the rebound effects presented in the appendix, we regress the logged monthly vehicle-
kilometers traveled, ln(s), on those logged fuel prices ln(p+) that are observed after a
13price increase from year t − 1t ot, and on those logged fuel prices ln(p−) that are ob-
served after a price decrease from year t−1t ot, as well as a vector of control variables
x described in the previous section:
ln(sit)=α0 + αp+ · ln(p+
it)+αp− · ln(p−
it)+αT
x · xit + ξi + νit . (12)
Subscripts i and t are used to denote the observation and time period, respectively,
and the superscript T designates the transposition of a vector. ξi denotes an unknown
individual-speciﬁc term, and νit is a random component that varies over individuals
and time.
To distinguish between the response to rising and falling prices, two price varia-
bles, p+ and p−, are included in speciﬁcation (12), with price variable p+ being deﬁned
as
p+
it = pit,i fpit > pi(t−1), (13)
and p+
it = 0 otherwise, while p− is generated from falling prices in a similar way (see
Table 1). Since travel demand shrinks with increasing fuel prices, the coefﬁcients of
both price variables, p− and p+, should be negative, as is conﬁrmed by our estimation
results presented below. It bears noting that our approach is less restrictive than the
classical ratchet speciﬁcation of TRAILL,C OLMAN, and YOUNG (1978), which assumes
that only prices rises above the previous maximum have asymmetric effects (DARGAY,
1992:168). In contrast, our approach is based on the assumption that each price rise, as
well as each price fall, may affect demand, albeit in a potentially different way.
While this also holds true for GATELY’s price decomposition approach, a ﬁnal re-
ason for choosing speciﬁcation (12) is that the temporal restrictiveness of our data base
does not allow for the application of price decomposition approaches, nor for error-
correction models, so that we cannot account for some sort of dynamic adjustment me-
chanisms to long-run relationships, as is done by DARGAY(1992), for instance. Instead,
we employ a quasi-static approach in which potential inward shifts of the demand
function are captured by year dummies, thereby leaving the form and curvature of the
demand function unchanged. In fact, for our empirical example, we have reason to be-
lieve that these time dummies would turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant, reﬂecting
14moderate or even vanishing shifts of the demand function, as we focus on households
that did not change their cars over the maximum of three years they are surveyed.
This belief is conﬁrmed by the fact that the year dummies included in the estimation
speciﬁcation are statistically insigniﬁcant both individually and as a whole, and have
therefore been left out in our ﬁnal estimations presented in the subsequent section.
Given speciﬁcation (12), for which a priori αp+ can be assumed to differ from αp−,
wearguethatthereboundeffecthastobeidentiﬁedbythenegativecoefﬁcientestimate
of ln(p−), as the rebound occurs in response to a decrease in unit cost for car travel due
to improved fuel efﬁciency. To our knowledge, the issue of asymmetry of fuel price
elasticities has never been addressed in the literature on the rebound effect, but it is
highly relevant for its correct deﬁnition and identiﬁcation if one is willing to identify
the rebound on the basis of price elasticities (for a discussion on this issue, see the
appendix).
The case where αp+  = αp− and, hence, demand responses to price increases differ
in magnitude from those to price decreases could be visualized by demand curves
kinked at the current price, so that demand is related to increasing and decreasing
prices in an asymmetric way (DARGAY, 1992:168). For single-vehicle households that
do not change their car within the survey period, as in our case, the intuition behind
such kinked demand curves may be that these households react to price rises with
a fuel-saving driving behavior that they maintain even when prices fall to original
levels. DARGAY and GATELY (1997:72) have referred to this behavior as “addiction
asymmetry”, reﬂecting the proclivity of consumers to more readily adapt new habits
than abandon them.
Whether this is actually the case can be examined by testing the following null
hypothesis:
H0 : αp+ = αp− , (14)
which, if correct, implies that model (12) reduces to the reversible speciﬁcations that
are typically employed to estimate the rebound effect (see e. g. FRONDEL,P ETERS, and
15VANCE, 2008).5 If, however, H0 is rejected, we argue that the rebound effect should be
identiﬁed by the negative of the estimate of αp−.
To provide for a reference point for the results obtained from panel estimation
methods (see e. g. FRONDEL and VANCE, 2010, for a discussion), we also estimate spe-
ciﬁcation (12) using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), although applying OLS me-
thods generally yields neither consistent nor efﬁcient estimation outcomes. While the
ﬁxed-effects estimator may be a potentially superior alternative, we ultimately focus
on random-effects methods, as the ﬁxed-effects estimator fails to efﬁciently estimate
the coefﬁcients of time-persistent variables, i. e. , variables that do not vary much wi-
thin a household over time. Furthermore, the random-effects estimator is particularly
attractive when the cross-section information, here determined by the number of hou-
seholds,ismuchlargerthanthenumberoftime-seriesobservations(HSIAO,2003),asis
the case for our database. Not least, random-effects methods also allow for the estima-
tion of coefﬁcients of time-invariant variables, which is precluded by the ﬁxed-effects
estimator.
5 Empirical Results
In line with our reasoning of the previous section, the ﬁxed-effects estimates repor-
ted in Table 2 are statistically insigniﬁcant for almost all variables included; this is
clearly the result of very low variability of time-persistent variables, such as the num-
ber of children or the number of employed household members. Moreover, we per-
form the classical test of BREUSCH and PAGAN (1979) to examine the superiority of the
random-effects model over an OLS estimation using pooled data. The test statistic of
this Lagrange multiplier test of χ2(1) = 176.03 clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no
heterogeneity among households: Var(ξi)=0.6
5Insteadofincluding p+ and p−,anequivalentwayoftestingasymmetrywouldhavebeentoinclude
p and p+ or p and p− (DARGAY, 1992:168) and to test for H0 : αp+ = 0o rH0 : αp− = 0, respectively.
6Nevertheless, in the results tables we also present the OLS outcomes to demonstrate the improve-
ments in the estimation results if heteroskedasticity is taken into account by employing GLS methods,
16In our discussion of the empirical results, we therefore focus on the random-
effects estimates. Several features of the results reported in Table 2 bear highlighting.
First, noting from the discussion in the previous section that the rebound effect is iden-
tiﬁed by the negative estimate of the coefﬁcient of ln(p−), the estimated coefﬁcients
suggest that 58% of the potential energy savings due to an efﬁciency improvement is
lost to increased driving. Also of note is that this estimate perfectly ﬁts to the rebound
range of 58% to 59% estimated by FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008) for the sub-
sample of single-vehicle German households observed between 1997 and 2005.
Table 2: Estimation Results for Travel Demand of Single-Vehicle Households.7
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(p+) ∗∗-0.663 (0.166) -0.258 (0.244) ∗∗-0.560 (0.149)
ln(p−) ∗∗-0.689 (0.157) -0.186 (0.294) ∗∗-0.584 (0.168)
# children 0.005 (0.024) 0.026 (0.090) 0.028 (0.031)
income ∗∗0.088 (0.034) 0.034 (0.053) ∗0.065 (0.031)
# employed ∗∗0.177 (0.030) 0.106 (0.060) ∗∗ 0.117 (0.030)
job change ∗∗0.168 (0.053) ∗∗ 0.179 (0.066) ∗∗ 0.179 (0.048)
vacation with car ∗∗0.448 (0.042) ∗∗ 0.314 (0.051) ∗∗ 0.374 (0.039)
population density ∗-0.054 (0.026) 0.303 (0.298) ∗-0.049 (0.021)
constant ∗∗6.440 (0.076) ∗∗ 6.596 (0.306) ∗∗ 6.532 (0.069)
Note: ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Observations used: 1,125. Number of households: 744.
Second, even without performing any tests, a superﬁcial inspection of the coefﬁ-
cient estimates of ln(p−) and ln(p+) tells us that the null hypothesis H0 : αp+ = αp−
cannot be rejected at any conventional level. This impression is conﬁrmed by a low χ2-
statistic of χ2(1)=0.02. The very close estimates of -0.560 and -0.584 thus indicate that
as is done by the random-effects estimator.
7To correct for the non-independence of repeated observations from the same households over the
years of the survey, observations are clustered at the level of the household, and the presented standard
errors are robust to this survey design feature.
17changes in driving behavior that are potentially induced by price peaks are entirely
reversed when prices fall back to original levels. In our example, therefore, the issue of
whether to identify the rebound via distinguishing between demand responses due to
fuel price increases or decreases appears to be moot.8
These results, however, may not be surprising given the fact that we delibera-
tely focus here on single-vehicle households that do not change their car during the
survey period. As presented in Table 3, we thus augment our sample by including
multi-vehicle households. Fundamental differences, though, cannot be observed from
the estimates, possibly due to the fact that multi-vehicle households comprise a rela-
tivelysmall share– about25%– ofthe sample.Most notably,there isagain noempirical
evidence for asymmetric fuel price responses. The χ2-statistic obtained from the test of
H0 : αp+ = αp− from the random-effects model is χ2(1)=0.04, suggesting the validity
of the reversible speciﬁcation.
Yet, a comparison of the estimation results reported in Tables 2 and 3 indicates
that the travel demand elasticity obtained from the sample limited to single-car house-
holds is somewhat more pronounced than that received from the sample that includes
multi-car households – although the discrepancies are not statistically signiﬁcant. If
price responses of single-car households were actually stronger than those of multi-
vehicle households, this may be due the fact that in multi-car households drivers are
able to choose among the most efﬁcient cars for their traveling purposes. To some de-
gree, this difference may also explain why the elasticity estimates reported by FRON-
DEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008), which were based exclusively on single car house-
holds, are on the high side of those appearing in the literature. Another key reason for
the high elasticities obtained here and by FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008) might
be that the elasticities from household-level data are generally larger than those from
aggregate time-series data. Finally, it bears noting that much of the research on this
8If we estimate the restrictive reversible speciﬁcation, with no allowance made for price increases
and decreases, more plausible results are obtained from a ﬁxed-effects estimation. The estimate of -0.46
for the logged fuel price is statistically signiﬁcant and of roughly the same magnitude as the elasticities
obtained from the random-effects model presented in Table 2.
18topic, particularly that using household level data, is drawn from the US, where elasti-
city estimates may be lower because of longer driving distances and fewer alternative
modes.
Table 3: Estimation Results for Travel Demand if Multi-Vehicle Households are inclu-
ded.
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(p+) ∗∗-0.590 (0.145) -0.018 (0.189) ∗∗-0.448 (0.127)
ln(p−) ∗∗-0.589 (0.142) 0.027 (0.233) ∗∗-0.480 (0.131)
# children 0.030 (0.021) 0.007 (0.072) ∗ 0.053 (0.021)
income ∗∗0.128 (0.030) -0.034 (0.042) ∗∗ 0.096 (0.026)
# employed ∗∗0.150 (0.026) -0.087 (0.053) ∗∗ 0.109 (0.026)
job change ∗∗0.118 (0.040) ∗∗ 0.111 (0.047) ∗∗ 0.113 (0.036)
vacation with car ∗∗0.406 (0.036) ∗∗ 0.275 (0.048) ∗∗ 0.341 (0.033)
multi-car households ∗∗0.442 (0.045) 0.148 (0.130) ∗∗ 0.472 (0.045)
population density ∗∗-0.059 (0.023) 0.080 (0.227) ∗-0.052 (0.021)
constant ∗∗6.385 (0.066) ∗∗ 6.960 (0.230) ∗∗ 6.482 (0.060)
Note: ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Observations used: 1,470. Number of households: 994.
There are additional discrepancies emerging from the sample of households with
multiple vehicles: While the number of children, for example, positively affects travel
demand for the whole sample, this variable does not play a signiﬁcant role in deter-
mining the travel behavior of single-car households. This may be due to the fact that
single-car households prioritize car use for commuting, requiring children to use pu-
blic transport systems more frequently. Conversely, the dummy variable indicating a
job change in the previous year has a larger effect for the single-car households, which
substantiates the logic that such households use the car primarily for commuting pur-
poses.
196 Summary and Conclusion
Although several empirical studies have shown that the negative demand response
to fuel price increases is higher in magnitude than the positive response to fuel price
decreases, the question as to whether this reﬂects a behavioral reaction or a manifesta-
tion of technical change continues to stimulate discussion (GRIFFIN and SCHULMAN,
2005). Our principal interest in this asymmetry question relates to its implications for
the estimation of the rebound effect, the behaviorally induced offset in the reduction of
energy consumption following efﬁciency improvements (CRANDALL, 1992). We argue
that if the responses to increasing and decreasing fuel prices are asymmetric, it would
require us to reference the fuel price elasticity derived from price decreases in order to
identify the rebound effect, as the rebound occurs in response to a decrease in unit cost
for car travel due to improved fuel efﬁciency.
Drawing on household-level mobility data from Germany, we have tested for
evidence of an asymmetric response to ﬂuctuations in fuel prices. By using panel da-
ta comprised of households who did not change their automobile during the survey
period, our econometric analysis was structured to allow for asymmetric price respon-
ses while at the same time minimizing the possibility that these arise from technical
change. Failure to control for asymmetry would result in an upwardly biased estimate
of the rebound, presuming that the response to price increases was indeed greater than
to decreases.
Our empirical estimates suggest that, at least for our empirical example, concerns
about such a bias are unsubstantiated. We have failed to reject the null hypothesis that
the magnitude of the response to a price increase is equal to that of a price decrease.
Our symmetry ﬁnding also maintains when we expand the sample to include house-
holds owning multiple cars. One implication emerging from this ﬁnding may be that
the price asymmetry observed in many other studies is largely the result of the sunk-
cost nature of energy-saving capital equipment, rather than behavioral inertia on the
part of consumers.
20From a policy perspective, the fact that the estimated rebound is relatively high
calls into question the effectiveness of the European Union’s current emphasis on efﬁ-
ciency standards as a pollution control instrument. The random-effects estimate of the
rebound resulting from both the asymmetric and the reversible speciﬁcation amounts
to58%forsingle-carhouseholds,whichisvirtuallythesameasthatobtainedby FRON-
DEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008), who used an abridged version of the current data set
that merely extended to the year 2005.
Since that time, annually averaged fuel prices climbed another 9% to reach a peak
in 2008, followed by a drop of 9% in the following year (ARAL2011). These ﬂuctuations
appear to have had no bearing on a key conclusion emerging from the data, namely
that between about 50% to 60% of the potential energy saving from efﬁciency impro-
vements in Germany is lost to increased driving. Given this response, we would argue
that fuel taxes should continue to play an important role in climate policy. Unlike fuel
efﬁciency standards, fuel taxes directly confront motorists with the cost of driving, the-
reby encouraging the purchase of more fuel efﬁcient vehicles and having an immediate
impact on driving behavior.
21Appendix: A Variety of Rebound Deﬁnitions
Along the lines of SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS (2008), we catalogue three widely
known deﬁnitions of the direct rebound effect that are based on elasticities with respect
to changes of either efﬁciencies, service-, or fuel prices, and add a fourth deﬁnition
that we believe is superior for empirical reasons. First, the most natural deﬁnition of
the direct rebound effect is based on the elasticity of the demand for a particular energy
service, such as conveyance, with respect to efﬁciency (see e. g. BERKHOUT et al., 2000).
This deﬁnition reﬂects the relative change in service demand s due to a percentage
increase in efﬁciency μ:




Second, instead of ημ(s), empirical estimates of the rebound effect are frequently
based on the negative of the price elasticity of service demand, ηps(s) (e.g. BINSWAN-
GER, 2001). As is shown, e. g. , by FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008:161), both
rebound deﬁnitions are equivalent if, ﬁrst, fuel prices pe are exogenous and, second,
service demand s solely depends on the service price ps := pe/μ, which is proportio-
nal to the fuel price pe for given efﬁciency μ:
Deﬁnition 2: ημ(s)=−ηps(s) . (16)
That the rebound may be captured by −ηps(s) reﬂects the fact that the direct rebound
effect is, in essence, a price effect, which works through shrinking service prices ps.
Third, empirical estimates of the rebound effect are sometimes necessarily ba-
sed on the negative own-price elasticity of fuel consumption, −ηpe(e), rather than on
−ηps(s), because data on fuel consumption and fuel prices is more commonly available
than on service demand and service prices.
Deﬁnition 3: ημ(s)=−ηpe(e) . (17)Deﬁnitions 2 and 3, however, are only equivalent if the energy efﬁciency μ is constant
(FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE, 2008:161). That is, the rebound deﬁnition given by
−ηpe(e) is equivalent to that given by ημ(s) only if three preconditions hold true: (1)
fuel prices pe are exogenous, (2) service demand s solely depends on the service price
ps, and (3) efﬁciency μ is constant.
To analyze asymmetric responses to changing driving cost, we focus here on a
fourth deﬁnition of the rebound effect that is given by the negative of the fuel price ela-
sticity ηpe(s) of the demand for transport services s. This focus is warranted for several
reasons. First, while the most natural deﬁnition of the direct rebound effect is based on
the elasticity of transport demand with respect to efﬁciency μ, Deﬁnition 1 is frequent-
ly not applicable, because in many empirical studies efﬁciency data is not available or
the data provides only limited variation in efﬁciencies (SORRELL,D IMITROUPOULOS,
SOMMERVILLE, 2009:1359).
Even more disconcerting is that observed efﬁciency increases may be endoge-
nous, rather than reﬂecting autonomous efﬁciency improvements. This is the case, for
instance, if a more efﬁcient car is purchased in response to a job change that results in a
longer commute. Hence, due to the likely endogeneity of fuel efﬁciency (see e. g. SOR-
RELL,D IMITROUPOULOS,S OMMERVILLE, 2009:1361), it would be wise to refrain from
including this variable in any model speciﬁcation aiming at estimating the response
to fuel price effects, as fuel efﬁciency may be a bad control (ANGRIST and PISCHKE,
2009:63). Rather than excluding μ from the analysis, alternative approaches are in-
strumental variable (IV) estimations or simultaneous equations systems that explain
vehicle miles traveled, fuel efﬁciency, and vehicle numbers at once. As we have no in-
strument at hand, we are unable to employ IV methods to cope with the endogeneity
of μ, nor are we able to estimate simultaneous equations systems due to data unavaila-
bility. In effect, we instead pursue the reduced form of such a simultaneous equations
system.
Another problem emerging from the likely endogeneity of the efﬁciency μ is that
it contaminates the rebound deﬁnition based on the negative of the service demandelasticity ηps(s) with respect to service price ps, which is given by ps = pe/μ. This
highlights a handicap of Deﬁnition 2, namely that service prices represent a conglome-
rate of efﬁciency and fuel prices, while more meaningful estimates of the rebound are
based on estimations in which fuel-price and efﬁciency effects are strictly separated.
The rebound deﬁnition that is based on the own-price elasticity of fuel consump-
tion, ηpe(e), is the most restrictive of these three deﬁnitions, as it requires the validity
of three preconditions, rather than merely two of them, as is the case with rebound
deﬁnition −ηps(s). Furthermore, in contrast to transport service demand s, the depen-
dent variable e underlying deﬁnition −ηpe(e) explicitly depends on efﬁciency μ. For
example, fuel consumption e would ceteris paribus reduce to half if efﬁciency μ were to
be doubled. This example illustrates that the likely endogenous variable μ needs to be
included in any model speciﬁcation for estimating ηpe(e), thereby potentially biasing
the empirical results.
For these reasons, we employ here a fourth rebound deﬁnition that is based on
the negative of the fuel price elasticity of transport demand, ηpe(s):
Deﬁnition 4: ημ(s)=−ηpe(s) . (18)
It is now shown that −ηpe(s) is equivalent to ημ(s) under the same assumptions as the
rebound deﬁnition given by −ηpe(e).
Proposition: If service demand s solely depends on ps, fuel prices pe are exogenous,
and energy efﬁciency μ is constant, then
ηpe(s)=ηps(s).
Proof: Using price relation ps = pe/μ derived in Section 2, the chain rule, and the






















]=ηps(s),where the last term in the most right bracket vanishes if efﬁciency μ is constant, i. e. ,
if
∂lnμ
∂ln pe = 0. 
In sum, although theory would suggest estimating the efﬁciency elasticity ημ(s)
to capture the rebound, the most promising empirical, yet indirect way to elicit the
rebound effect is based on the estimation of fuel price elasticities, as fuel prices ty-
pically exhibit sufﬁcient variation and, in contrast to fuel efﬁciency, can be regarded
as parameters that are largely exogenous to individual households. Among these fuel
price elasticities, the discussion provided in this appendix suggests selecting the fuel
price elasticity of transport demand, ηpe(s), for estimating the rebound effect, rather
than employing other fuel- or service price elasticities that have been applied in the
literature.References
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